Some questions about reality and morality resist easy answers: What ultimately matters? How should we act if the universe is infinite? Can our decisions correlate with events we never causally touch? For many reflective people, these puzzles are not abstract games but live problems that shape career choices, priorities, and emotional life.
Drawing inspiration from Joe Carlsmith’s work on the “outer reaches” of effective altruism and philosophical reflection, this article offers a structured guide to navigating serious philosophical confusion while still living a deliberate and humane life.
1. What Is Serious Philosophical Confusion?
Philosophical confusion goes beyond having an unanswered question. It arises when you suspect that your entire way of framing the question may be inadequate, and yet you still need to act. This is especially salient in areas like ethics, decision theory, consciousness, and the long-term future of civilization.
1.1 Key features of deep confusion
- Multiple plausible but incompatible theories: Different frameworks each capture something important but cannot all be true at once.
- Low confidence in your own reasoning: You suspect that some hidden assumptions may be doing most of the work.
- High stakes: The choice between theories can radically change what you think you ought to do, especially about global priorities and longtermism.
- No clear expert consensus: Professional philosophers, scientists, or decision theorists themselves remain divided.
This kind of confusion is not merely intellectual discomfort. It can reshuffle your view of what a good life, a just society, or a responsible career should look like.
2. Three Domains Where Confusion Bites Hard
Carlsmith’s work centers on cases where abstract puzzles intersect with practical decision-making. Three domains are especially disorienting: decision theory under correlation, ethical theory in infinite worlds, and longtermist ethics under uncertainty.
2.1 Decision theory and “entanglement without causation”
Standard decision theory often assumes that you affect only what you causally influence. But in scenarios involving copies, simulations, or predictors, your choice may be logically or evidentially linked to distant events even when no physical signal connects them. This raises questions such as:
- Should you cooperate with an identical copy facing the same decision, knowing you will both reason the same way?
- Should you treat your choice as evidence about what a powerful predictor has already done?
- Can it be rational to act as if you influence the past, because your decision is correlated with earlier events?
These scenarios feed debates between causal decision theory, evidential decision theory, and more exotic proposals like functional or logical decision theories. Each aims to preserve some combination of intuitive rationality, consistency, and good outcomes, but they often conflict in high-stakes thought experiments used in the philosophy and AI safety literature.
2.2 Ethics in an infinite universe
If space or time is infinite, then there may be infinitely many happy lives, tragedies, and moral outcomes. In such settings, common moral theories struggle to compare options because standard ways of aggregating value rely on finite totals or well-defined averages.
Problems include:
- Divergent sums: If both options lead to an infinite amount of good, how can one be morally better than the other?
- Ordering sensitivity: Rearranging an infinite sequence of values can change the sum or average, undermining intuitive comparisons.
- Loss of simple utilitarian guidance: The attractive simplicity of maximizing total well-being breaks down when totals are infinite.
Research in cosmology suggests that infinite space or eternal inflation are live possibilities, so these issues are not merely hypothetical. For people trying to reason impartially about the future, this can upend familiar moral frameworks.
2.3 Longtermism and the shape of concern for the future
Longtermist thinking emphasizes that the vast majority of morally relevant beings may live in the future, so actions that shape the long-run trajectory of civilization could be extremely important. But even within longtermism, you can distinguish between at least two orientations:
| Orientation | Core focus | Typical examples |
|---|---|---|
| Welfare-focused longtermism | Improving the expected well-being of future individuals, often modeled as a large but finite population. | Reducing existential risk, global catastrophic risk, pandemics, or AI-related disasters. |
| Wisdom-focused longtermism | Preserving options and increasing the quality of humanity’s future decision-making and understanding. | Improving governance, epistemic institutions, moral reflection, and the capacity for global coordination. |
Serious philosophical confusion pushes in the direction of what Carlsmith calls something like “wisdom longtermism”: when you are unsure what ultimately matters, it can be rational to invest in the future’s ability to figure it out better.
3. Why Confusion Can Be a Virtue
In many areas, we treat confusion as a problem to be eliminated. But with foundational questions, an appropriate level of confusion may be a sign of intellectual honesty. There are at least three reasons to treat deep puzzlement as an achievement rather than a failure.
3.1 Our concepts evolved for survival, not metaphysics
Our everyday categories—objects, time, self, causation, morality—arose in a context of finite, local challenges. Modern physics already forces us to revise naive ideas of space, time, and identity; quantum field theory and general relativity place strong constraints on how causality and locality can be understood. Expecting our folk moral and metaphysical concepts to effortlessly scale to cosmic or infinite settings may simply be unrealistic.
3.2 Past revolutions show how wrong we can be
From heliocentrism to evolution to quantum mechanics, scientific revolutions often revealed that our intuitive picture of the world was radically incomplete. Given that track record, it would be surprising if our current best theories of ethics and rational choice required no further conceptual overhaul.
3.3 Ambition plus humility beats premature certainty
Trying to make decisions that affect billions of people or entire future civilizations is an ambitious project. Ambition without humility invites moral catastrophe; humility without ambition risks passive complicity. Recognizing that we are deeply confused, yet still trying to steer wisely, is a demanding but defensible middle ground.
4. A Practical Framework for Acting Under Confusion
How can we move from abstract disorientation to concrete guidance? One way is to treat philosophical uncertainty more like empirical uncertainty and apply decision-theoretic tools to our moral and conceptual doubts.
4.1 Treat moral views as hypotheses, not dogmas
Instead of asking “Which theory is true?” in an all-or-nothing way, you can assign rough credences to different moral views and let those credences guide your choices. For instance, you might:
- Give some weight to total utilitarianism, some to person-affecting views, some to deontological constraints, and some to virtue-based perspectives.
- Privilege theories that seem especially resilient to reflection and argument over those that rely heavily on one controversial intuition.
- Regularly update your weights in light of new arguments, experiences, and critiques.
This “moral uncertainty” approach is explored in depth in contemporary analytic ethics and can yield structured recommendations even when you feel far from moral certainty.
4.2 Hedge across worldviews
If different plausible theories point to different priorities, you can deliberately diversify your efforts. For example, someone might:
- Allocate some time or money to reducing global catastrophic risk (favored by welfare-focused longtermism).
- Support institutions that improve global epistemics and governance (favored by wisdom-focused longtermism).
- Maintain a baseline of near-term humanitarian concern (favored by person-affecting views and common-sense morality).
This hedging strategy mirrors portfolio diversification in finance: you reduce the risk of doing something morally disastrous under any particular plausible theory.
4.3 Prioritize reversible and option-preserving actions
When you are unsure what matters, actions that keep doors open for future learning can be especially attractive. These include:
- Reducing existential risks that would permanently curtail the future.
- Supporting institutions that protect open inquiry, civil liberties, and high-quality science.
- Developing governance structures that can adapt as we learn more about AI, biotechnology, and other transformative technologies.
By protecting the possibility of further reflection, you give your descendants a better chance to resolve the questions that currently baffle us.
5. Emotional and Psychological Coping
Living with the thought that your deepest convictions might be radically mistaken can be emotionally destabilizing. People inclined toward effective altruism or longtermism are often especially vulnerable, because they care intensely about getting it right. Coping well requires skills beyond abstract reasoning.
5.1 Making space for uncertainty without paralysis
It is possible to acknowledge that you do not fully understand the moral universe while still making wholehearted choices. A helpful stance is something like: “This is my best current judgment, endorsed under reflection, but held lightly enough to revise.” Practices that can help include:
- Reflective equilibrium: Regularly revisiting your moral beliefs to check coherence between principles and particular judgments.
- Journaling and meta-reflection: Writing about how your views are changing over time can make uncertainty feel like growth rather than collapse.
- Community with epistemic norms: Participating in groups that value honest disagreement, steelmanning, and openness to being wrong.
5.2 Guarding against fanaticism and burnout
High-stakes moral reasoning can push people toward fanaticism (single-minded pursuit of one theory) or burnout (exhaustion and disengagement). To counter this, it can be wise to:
- Maintain non-moral sources of meaning—personal relationships, creative projects, aesthetics, or spiritual life.
- Set limits on how much of your identity is tied to any single philosophical position.
- Practice self-compassion: you are one finite agent confronting a bewildering universe; perfection is not on offer.
5.3 Owning your agency
Even under uncertainty, you cannot outsource responsibility entirely to abstract theories, institutions, or communities. At some point you must decide what kind of force you wish to be in the world. That involves:
- Looking squarely at your real motives, not just your stated principles.
- Acknowledging tradeoffs you are actually willing to make, not only ones you endorse in thought experiments.
- Choosing a pattern of life that you can stand behind, even if future philosophy proves you wrong in some respects.
6. Implications for AI, Policy, and Global Priorities
These questions are not confined to armchair speculation. They matter acutely for technology governance, especially artificial intelligence, and for global policy more broadly.
6.1 AI as a pressure cooker for philosophical confusion
Advanced AI systems raise questions about agency, alignment, and value that intersect with the same decision-theoretic and ethical puzzles discussed above. For instance:
- AI training and deployment may require precise specifications of goals under moral uncertainty.
- Scenarios involving AI copies, simulations, or large multi-agent systems can highlight non-causal correlations between decisions.
- Rapid technological change can compress centuries of moral evolution into decades, increasing the cost of getting basic assumptions wrong.
Researchers working on AI alignment and governance are already grappling with these issues, drawing on decision theory, ethics, and social science.
6.2 Institutionalizing wisdom-oriented longtermism
If we accept that we are philosophically confused, governments and major institutions may wish to embed this recognition into their structures. Possible measures include:
- Creating dedicated units that study long-term global risks and moral uncertainty, similar to existing foresight or strategic planning offices.
- Embedding ethical and philosophical expertise alongside technical expertise in high-stakes domains like AI and biotechnology.
- Funding research programs on foundational questions in decision theory and ethics, akin to how basic research in physics is supported.
Such efforts align with long-term global challenges identified by international bodies, including climate change, pandemic risk, and transformative technologies, where uncertainty about values and probabilities is central.
7. A Personal Practice for Navigating Confusion
For individuals, it can help to have a concrete practice rather than only high-level principles. One possible template:
- Clarify your live questions. Write down 3–5 philosophical questions that genuinely affect your life decisions (for example, “How much should I prioritize the far future?” or “Are there side-constraints I would never violate?”).
- Map plausible views. For each question, list 2–3 serious candidate answers, along with the strongest arguments for and against each.
- Assign rough credences. Give each view a rough probability, not as a final verdict but as a reflection of your current state of mind.
- Design a hedged plan. Choose actions—career moves, donations, projects—that look at least acceptable from several of the views you take seriously.
- Schedule reflection checkpoints. Every year or two, revisit your questions, credences, and plan. Treat revisions as progress, not instability.
This kind of practice does not resolve deep philosophical disagreement, but it can turn overwhelming abstraction into a manageable, evolving stance toward the world.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Q1: If everything is so uncertain, why not just follow common sense and ignore philosophy?
Common sense is a valuable starting point, but it is shaped by local history, culture, and evolved heuristics. In areas like global catastrophic risk, AI governance, or intergenerational justice, common sense gives little guidance. Philosophical reflection—however imperfect—can highlight hidden assumptions and suggest new kinds of responsibility that everyday morality overlooks.
Q2: Isn’t hedging across moral views just a way of avoiding hard decisions?
Hedging can be an evasion if it becomes an excuse to never commit. Used properly, though, it is a disciplined response to genuine uncertainty: you explicitly recognize multiple serious candidate theories and design actions that are robust across them. This requires hard work, not avoidance.
Q3: How do I avoid obsessing over philosophical puzzles to the point that I stop living my life?
One strategy is to set boundaries: allocate specific times for deep reflection, and separate those from periods when you focus on relationships, concrete projects, or rest. Another is to choose a “good enough for now” plan that you can live with while continuing to think in the background, rather than waiting for perfect clarity that may never come.
Q4: Do I need a background in philosophy or mathematics to engage with these issues?
Formal training can help with some technical debates, especially in decision theory or infinite ethics. But many of the most important questions—about what you value, what kind of world you want to help create, and how to relate to your own uncertainty—are accessible with patience, curiosity, and honest conversation.
Q5: What is one concrete step I can take this month?
Choose a single decision that matters to you—such as where to donate, how to spend a portion of your time, or what to study next. Write down how two or three different plausible moral views would evaluate that decision. Then pick an option that looks at least reasonably good from more than one of those perspectives, and commit to revisiting the reasoning later.
References
- Carlsmith, J. — Can you control the past? — JoeCarlsmith.com. 2021-08-27. https://joecarlsmith.com/2021/08/27/can-you-control-the-past/
- Garriga, J. & Vilenkin, A. — Holographic Multiverse — Journal of Cosmology and Astroparticle Physics. 2009-01-15. https://doi.org/10.1088/1475-7516/2009/01/021
- Bostrom, N. — Infinite Ethics — Analysis and Metaphysics. 2011-01-01. https://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/infinite.pdf
- Greaves, H. & MacAskill, W. — The Case for Strong Longtermism — Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford. 2019-09-23. https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org/the-case-for-strong-longtermism/
- Carroll, S. — What If Time Really Exists? — Annual Review of Nuclear and Particle Science. 2019-10-19. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-nucl-101918-023617
